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In this paper, I focus on how macroprudential or capital control
policy complements monetary policy of small open economies in the
face of foreign interest rate shock. I build the base model followed by
Aoki et al. (2018) and simulate the impulse response to the foreign
interest rate shock and compare the two policies in terms of welfare.
The results show that macroeconomic variables under low interest rate
environment are more volatile than under high interest rate when the
foreign interest rate shock is transmitted to SOEs. It implies that
low interest rate environment is more vulnerable to recession than
high interest rate environment. I also find that both macroprudential
policy and capital control can help to mitigate the influence of foreign
interest rate shock but capital control is a better instrument than
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After the global financial crisis (GFC), small open economies (SOEs) with
high external dependence have been greatly affected by global factors, not
only in the real sector but also in the financial sector. Monetary policy de-
cisions in major countries such as the United States can have a significant
impact on the changes of the market interest rates and exchange rates in
SOEs through a wide variety of channels. Since the GFC, the low interest
rate trend has been prolonged due to the zero interest rate policy of major
countries such as the US, ECB, and Japan and the yield searching behavior
of global investors has expanded to the emerging market economies. As a
result, SOEs’ financial markets became financial integration and the influ-
ence of global factors on SOEs’ financial markets has increased compared to
before the financial crisis (Ahmed and Zlate (2014) and Forbes and Warnock
(2012)). One of evidence to support this is that the size of cross-border fi-
nancial asset holdings has significantly increased over the past 20 years. As
shown in table 1, the external financial debt of major countries increased
from 3.6 times (Sweden) to 7.1 times (Australia) from 2000 to 2020. As well
as major countries, Korea, a small open economy, increased about 6.7 times
from $223.1 billion in 2000 to $1496.7 billion in 2020. As such, as the in-
ternational integration of financial markets expands, the monetary policy of
major economies has become a stronger impact on capital in-and-outflows,
as well as the interest rates differential and exchange rates in small open
economies.
The expansion of the influence of global factors can significantly affect
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Table 1: External Financial Liabilities for Selected Countries
(billions of dollars)
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Australia 441.0 982.1 2,088.9 2,296.3 3,116.3
Korea, Rep. of 223.1 512.0 826.4 939.5 1,496.7
Norway 159.3 413.5 830.7 788.3 980.5
Sweden 499.3 853.2 1,453.4 1,460.8 1,821.3
Thailand 114.0 147.5 305.0 381.8 550.1
United States 9,178.6 15,214.9 24,279.6 30,892.2 46,267.6
Source: International Investment Position, IMF
each country’s foreign exchange rate and monetary policy decision which is
relevant to the trilemma-dilemma debate. According to the trilemma hy-
pothesis, a country cannot achieve three policy goals simultaneously: stable
exchange rate, free international capital mobility and monetary policy au-
tonomy at achieving domestic goals. That is, to achieve two of these three
policy goals, one must be abandoned. Thus, if the trilemma is established, the
independence of monetary policy can be ensured by giving up currency sta-
bility through the adoption of a flexible exchange rate regime. On the other
hands, Rey (2015) suggests the dilemma hypothesis that whenever capital is
freely mobile, the global financial cycle constrains domestic monetary policy
regardless of the exchange rate regime.
The SOEs such as Korea seek to achieve the two goals of free capital
mobility and independent monetary policy while absorbing external shocks
through exchange rate fluctuations. If the trilemma is established, an inde-
pendent monetary policy is possible in principle for economies that adopt
floating exchange rates regime. For example, even if the US policy interest
rate rises, the flexible exchange rate system made the yields of Korea and
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the US of government bonds be the same, so capital outflow from Korea
to the US does not occur and the domestic monetary policy can be imple-
mented according to internal circumstances. However, if the influence of
global factors on the domestic financial market is excessive, it will be diffi-
cult to sufficiently absorb the impact of external shocks by only changing the
exchange rate. Furthermore, the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy
may be weakened (Bruno and Shin (2015) and Turner (2014).) There is a
question as to whether a fully floating exchange rate system can be oper-
ated in SOEs in reality. In the case of many SOEs, since their own currency
is not denominated in the international financial market, they are financed
through a global currency such as the dollar, which is inevitably affected
by the external environment (so-called original sin). If the exchange rate
excessively fluctuates, the value of external debt will be able to change sub-
stantially. Thus it will have a negative impact on the real economy. As a
result, many SOEs have incentives to operate monetary policy that focuses on
the exchange rate to stabilize the external economy rather than the domestic
economy. To stabilize the exchange rate against external factors, the policy
rate must eventually be changed according to the exchange rate. Therefore,
the argument that independent monetary policies cannot be implemented in
SOEs even if they actually adopt a flexible exchange rate regime has became
more persuasive after the GFC.
In this context, as the financial integration accelerates, there is also an
argument that independent monetary policy is impossible without capital
control or macroprudential policy. In other words, the independence of mon-
etary policy in SOEs is weakening regardless of the exchange rate regime
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and the improvement of independence is possible through the management
of capital movement. For example, as liquidity became plentiful after quan-
titative easing in the US, international investment banks invested heavily in
financial instruments in the EMEs. Then, the central banks in the EMEs
lost control of long-term interest rates. Even if the central banks intend to
tighten the economy through the policy rates, long-term interest rates are
not determined by the central bank, but by international capital, so there is
practically no independence of monetary policy. Therefore, long-term interest
rates, which have a greater influence on the real economy than short-term in-
terest rates, respond more sensitively to global financial conditions. In other
words, it means that the transmission process from the policy rate to long-
term interest rates in SOEs is deteriorated, and the influence of monetary
policy on the domestic economy undermines. Thus it is difficult to ensuure
the independence of monetary policy if the flow of funds is not controlled.
If there exist some tools that can absorb foreign shocks such as capital
in- and out-flows, monetary policy will be able to focus solely on domestic
shocks. The alternatives to support monetary policy is capital control and
macroprudential policy. Rey (2015) argues that under the circumstance that
foreign capital flows lead to asset price bubbles, excess credit creation, and
financial instability, capital controls or some tool of active capital account
management is necessary in many countries and mentions “independent mon-
etary policies are possible if and only if the capital account is managed.” IMF
(2012) states that capital liberalization is not always desirable for all coun-
tries, but that capital flow management measures, including capital control,
can be utilized limitedly if the rapid influx of capital increases financial sys-
4
tem instability.
In this paper, I focus on how macroprudential policy and capital control
complements monetary policy of SOEs in the face of foreign interest rate
shock. Specifically, the research questions are as follows:
1. Is the impact of foreign interest rate shock under low interest rate
environment greater than that under high interest rate environment? If the
low-interest rate trend is defined as after the GFC, and the high-interest
rate trend is defined as before the GFC, it enables to compare whether the
impact of the foreign rate shock on macroeconomics variables has changed
before and after the GFC.
2. Can macroprudential or capital control policy mitigate the shock of
foreign interest rate shock? In other words, if these two policies mitigate
the fluctuation of macroeconomic variables caused by the foreign interest
rate shock, the domestic monetary policy can focus on the internal condi-
tions. It implies that managing the capital movement can help improve the
independence of monetary policy.
3. If both two policies are effective to mitigate the foreign interest rate
shock, which is the better policy to complement monetary policy? In terms
of welfare, I can compare between the effect of capital control and macropru-
dential policy.
Specifically, I employ New Keynesian with a open economy framework
based on Aoki et al. (2018) (henceforth ABK) to examine the interaction
between these two policies and monetary policy in SOEs. The ABK frame-
work incorporates a banking sector into a small open economy model. This
banking sector plays a significant role in the model in that the impact of
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foreign shock on macroeconomic variables can be amplified. Introducing the
banking sector is suitable for the small open economy model considering that
the share of banks in the financial sector is larger in emerging economies than
that in advanced economies (Kitano and Takaku, 2020). Moreover, it enables
to analyze the effect of capital control and macroprudential policy by taxing
on foreign borrowing or banking capital.
The main results that I find are as follows:
1. In the case of foreign interest rate shock, the fluctuation of macroeco-
nomic variables in the low interest rate circumstance is greater than in the
high interest rate circumstance. In other words, It implies that low inter-
est rate environment is more vulnerable to recession than high interest rate
environment.
2. Both capital control and macroprudential policy appear to mitigate the
impact of foreign interest rate shock. This can be interpreted that the central
bank of SOEs focuses more on the domestic condition such as stabilization of
inflation and GDP gap rather than the external condition such as fluctuation
of exchange rate.
3. From the point of view of social welfare, capital control is a better
instrument than macroprudential policy. Therefore, it is effective to use
capital control for dealing with the event of foreign interest rate shock.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
related literature. Section 3 describes the model based on DSGE framework.
Section 4 provides the results under several scenarios. Section 5 concludes
and discusses implication of the findings.
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2 Literature review
Before the GFC, the literatures show that foreign factors do not have a signif-
icant influence on the transmission of monetary policy and its effectiveness.
Boivin and Giannoni (2008) examines the relationship between international
forces and the US macroeconomic variables by using factor augmented VAR
and suggests that in the case of the United States, global forces do not have
play significant role in the monetary policy mechanism. Woodford (2007)
concludes that international finance integration has little effect on mone-
tary policy through the NK model with an open economy. However, after
the GFC, due to the advent of zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) in major
economies, many EMEs experienced changes of unprecedented magnitude
in capital flows. Economists raised doubts as to whether EMEs could con-
trol the spillover of major countries’ interest rate shocks only by adopting
floating exchange rates regime. Rey (2015) argues the dilemma theory that
large capital movement after the financial crisis make it difficult to ensure
monetary independence regardless of exchange rate regime. Bruno and Shin
(2015) and Turner (2014) also mention that the spillover of long term in-
terest rate caused by the monetary policy of advanded countries cannot be
prevented solely by flexible exchange rates. Obstfeld (2015) reports that the
synchronization of long-term interest rates is experienced in countries with a
flexible exchange rate regime as well as countries with a fixed exchange rate
regime.
In addition, policymakers and economists argue that some tools such as
capital controls and macroprudential regulations need to mitigate the vulner-
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ability of EMEs to external shock (Rey (2015) and IMF (2012)). Moreover,
waves in capital flows have generated a strand of literature focused on the role
of capital controls and macroprudential policy. Jeanne and Korinek (2010)
and Bianchi (2011) find that capital control or macroprudential policy can
be welfare improving by reducing the likelihood of “Sudden Stops” crises.
Fahri and Werning (2012) employ the NK model with a small open economy
to examine the optimal capital control in fixed and floating exchange rate
regime. With fixed exchange rates, capital control has an important role to
ensure the monetary independence. In addition, in floating exchange rates, it
mitigates the depreciation of exchange rate and the drop in consumption and
outflow of capital. Kitano and Takaku (2017) set the small open economy
with financial friction between domestic banks and foreign investors and find
that capital control is effective in the presence of borrowing denominated by
foreign currency. De Paoli (2013) also argues that capital control is benefi-
cial for economy by welfare analysis based on the second-order perturbation
methods. Korinek and Sandri (2016) compare the effectiveness of macro-
prudential policy and capital control in the small open economy model with
the financial constraint on borrowers and conclude that macroprudential pol-
icy reduces the indebtedness of leveraged borrowers whereas capital controls
induce more precautionary behavior for both borrower and savers.
Another strand of literature focuses on the effect of using capital con-
trol and macroprudential policy combined with monetary policy. David and
Presno (2017) examine the relationship between capital control and inde-
pendence of monetary policy in a flexible exchange rate regime and find
that capital control can help central bank more focus on domestic variables.
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Unsal (2013) analyzes the relationship between macroprudential policy and
monetary policy using the open economy model and argues that macropru-
dential policy can complement the monetary policy under the capital inflow
and macroprudential policy is more effective than capital control. On the
other hand, Nispi Landi (2020) and Kitano and Takaku (2020) shows that
the welfare-improving effect of capital control is larger than that of macro-
prudential policy under the foreign interest rate shock in EMEs.
3 Model
To analyze how to interact macroprudential policy and capital control with
monetary policy, I build base model followed by ABK (2018) framework.
This model is the conventional New Keyenesian model in a small open econ-
omy with financial intermediaries (banking sector). It includes the balance
sheet channel which plays a role to amplify the effedct of the external shock.
To compare the effect of two intstruments, I additionally denote macropru-
dential policy as tax on banks’ lending and capital control as tax on foreign
borrowing1. In addition, I assume that a central bank follows the augmented
Taylor rule considering foreign interest rate as well as inflation, output gap
(Daivd and Presno (2017)). The economy is populated by households (work-
ers and bankers), a final goods producer, a continuum of intermediate goods
producers and policy makers (government and central bank) that sets capital
control, macroprudential policy and monetary policy. I describe the problem
of each agent in turn.




3.1.1 Final goods sector
It is assumed that the final goods producer purchases intermediate goods yi,t,
i ∈ [0, 1] from the intermediate goods market at a price Pi,t and produces final
goods under perfect competition according to a constant returns to scale, as











where η > 1. Then the final goods producer faces the profit maximization










Solving the first order condition, it derives the demand curve of intermediate















3.1.2 Intermediate goods sector
It is assumed that the intermediate goods market is monopolistic competitive
and each producer i inputs capital k′it, imported material mit, and labor
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where αK , αM and αK +αM ∈ (0, 1), and At is aggregate productivity shock.
Let Zt, εt and wt define the rental price of capital, the price of imported
material and the wage rate in terms of final goods. Then the minimized unit









To incorporate price rigidity into the model, I also assume that the in-
termediate goods producers pay additional cost in the style of Rotemberg
(1982) in which firms face a quadratic cost of price adjustment. In other








. Each differentiated intermediate goods producer
i chooses pit, yit to maximize the expectation of discounted value of profit,





















where Λ0,t is the stochastic discount factor of the representative households
and κ is the price stickiness parameter. Then the first order condition with
respect to pit under the symmetric equilibrium pit = Pt is derived as
(πt − 1)πt =
1
κ









where πt = PtPt−1 is one plus the inflation rate of the final goods. A usual
New Keyenesian Philips curve can be derived via a log-linear approximation







where x̂t = (xt − x)/x is the proportional deviation from the steady state
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(6)












Note that the subscript of aggregate capital stock K is t − 1 not t, it
implies that capital stock is accumulated by the end of the last period and










1− αK − αM
αK
(8)
The law of motion for capital is given by
Kt = It + λKt−1 (9)
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where λ ∈ (0, 1) is one minus constant depreciation rate and It is investment.









It where the quadratic
term is the additional production cost of supplying investment goods that
occur when there is a difference between It and the non-stochastic steady
state level I.
3.2 Households
Following Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Getler and Kiyotaki (2010), I formu-
late the households sector that involved the financial intermediaries (banks)
as well as goods producers. The representative household consists of two
types of members - bankers and workers, where the total population size is
normalized to be unity. A banker remains a banker in the next period with
probability σ or retires in the next period with probability 1−σ. The retired
bankers become workers and are replaced by the same number of workers who
become new bankers. As a results, the proportion between the two types of
members remains constant over time. The retired bankers take net worth as
dividends and new bankers receive ξ fraction of total asset from households
as initial funds.
Workers are able to own capital (equity) directly and also save deposits
in banks. However, if they hold the ownership of capital, the additional







Kt are incurred to receive the same
payoff as bankers. κh is a parameter of direct finance cost that represents a
disadvantage of workers relative to bankers in financing business. In case of
savings, the deposit contract is nominal and short term and non-contingent.
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Therefore, if workers deposit Dnt in this period, they can receive (1 + it)Dnt
in the next period, where it represents the nominal interest rate on deposit.
On the other hand, workers cannot directly own foreign debt due to a
lack of knowledge and ability. Therefore, all financial transactions between
foreign and home agents are only possible through home banks. In addition,
the financial transactions with foreign agents are denominated in foreign
currency because the small open economy’s currency of is not available in
the rest of world. It implies that small open economy has to bear the risk of
fluctuating foreign exchange rates.
The representative households solve the following maximization problem
with respect to consumption Ct, labor supply Lt, direct capital ownership

















t ) +Dt = wtLt + Πt + (Zt + λQt)K
h
t−1 +RtDt−1
where wt is real wage Qt is the equity price in terms of goods, Dt is the real
value of deposit (Dnt /Pt) and Rt =
1+it−1
πt
is the real interest rate on deposit
from t − 1 to t. β is the discount rate, ζ is the inverse of Frisch elasticity
if labor supply and ζ0 is the inverse of labor supply capacity in which these
parameters satisfy 0 < β < 1 and ζ, ζ0 > 0. Πt is the real profits from
































+(1− σ)[(Zt + λQt)Kbt−1 −RtDt−1 − εtR∗t−1D∗t−1]− ξ(Zt + λQt)Kbt−1
The first two terms are the profits from production of differentiated goods
and investment goods and third term is the dividend for the retired bankers
and fourth term is the start-up fund for the new bankers. The profits from
final goods production can be ignored due to perfect competition.
The first of conditions for consumptions, labor, holding capital and de-






















1 = Et(Λt,t+1Rt+1) (12)





















The balance sheet of a bank is given by
Qtk
b
t = dt + nt + εtd
∗
t
where nt is the net worth, kbt is capital holding, d∗t is the foreign debt and
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εtis the real exchange rate. That is, the bank’s investment in capital is
financed through the value of net worth, deposit from households, borrowing
form foreign economy. Banks are exposed to the fluctuation of the exchange
rate since they are holding foreign debt denominated foreign currency. If
the domestic currency depreciates due to the foreign interest rate shock, the
burden of foreign debt in domestic currency terms increases. It leads to
decline the net worth and decrease the investment. Through the balance
sheet channel, the exchange rate amplifies the effect of a foreign interest rate
shock on the economy.
Furthermore, I assume that borrowing from foreign economy is subject















and κb is a parameter of management cost for foreign borrow-
ing. As the proportion of assets financed by foreign borrowing x increases,
borrowing costs increase. Therefore, despite the relatively cheaper borrowing
costs due to low interest rates in foreign economy, the existence of the man-
agement costs induce that banks cannot continue to increase the proportion
of foreign borrowing. Considering the management costs and macropruden-
tial regulation and capital control on the bank’s balance sheet, the following
flow of funds constraint of a bank can be derived
[







t = (1 + τ
N
t )nt + dt + (1− τD∗t )εtd∗t
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where τKt and τD∗t are the tax rate on capital holding and foreign debt re-
spectively and τNt is the subsidy rate on net worth. The bank’s net worth
evolves as the difference between earnings on assets and payments on debt
nt = (Zt + λQt)k
b
t−1 −Rtdt−1 − εtR∗t−1d∗t−1 (14)
where R∗t is real foreign interest rate from t− 1 to t. It can be also nominal
interest rate because there is no inflation in foreign economy. The net worth
of a new banker is given by
nnewt = ξ(Zt + λQt)Kt−1
Given that a banker manages a bank until retirement and receives a bank’s
net worth as a dividend upon retirement, the bank maximizes the expected








where nt+j is net worth (dividend) of the bank when a bank retires at t + j
and Λt,t+j is stochastic discount factor of the representative household.
To limit on the bank’s ability to raise funds, I introduce the moral hazard
problem as ABK (2018) model. A banker can decide whether to manage
a bank honestly or divert assets for personal use. If operated honestly, the
payoffs will be realized in the next period. However, if a banker diverts assets,
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a bank become bankrupt. This induces an incentive constraint:
Vt ≥ Θ(xt)Qtkt (15)





is the fraction of assets financed by foreign borrowing and
θ and θ0 are both positive. The parameter θ represents the extent to which
foreign lenders improve the corporate governance of domestic bankers and θ0
represents a severity of the bank moral hazard. The left-hand side of (15)
represents the gains from operating honestly and the right-hand side of (15)
represents the gains from diverting. Thus the incentive constraint, in which
the left-hand side must be greater than or equal to the right-hand side, must
be satisfied in order that the rational creditors supplies funds to the bank.
Each bank chooses the capital holding kt, domestic deposit dt and foreign
debt d∗t to maximize the value function as
Vt = Et{Λt,t+1[(1− σ)nt+1 + σVt+1]}
subject to the balance sheet constraint (14) and the incentive constraint (15).












Denote φt = Qtktnt as the the leverage multiple. From the balance sheet
























































subject to the incentive constraint





















νt = Et {Ωt+1Rt+1} (18)
Ωt+1 = Λt,t+1(1− σ + σψt+1)
It can be interpreted that Ωt+1 is the stochastic discount factor of the
banker, µt is the excess return on capital over domestic deposit, µ∗t is the
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cost advantage of foreign currency debt over domestic deposit, and νt is
the marginal cost of deposit. I assume that µt and µ∗t are strictly positive.
Considering that the incentive constraint is binding, the first of condition
can be derived as
φt =




x2tνt − (µt + µ∗xt)
(19)



































and xt is increasing in µtνt ,
µ∗t
νt
. Intuitively, if the cost
advantage of foreign debt relative to domestic deposit and/or the excess
return of capital over domestic deposit are large, the bank raise the leverage
as well as funds from the foreign economy.
3.4 Government
The government implements macroprudential policy and capital control as
taxes on capital holding and foreign borrowing of banks and returns the tax
revenue to banks as a subsidy for their net worth. Let τKt denotes the tax
rate on capital holding, τD∗t denotes the tax rate on foreign debt and τNt
denotes the subsidy rate on net worth. The government budget constraint is
given by










where Nt, Kbt and D∗t are aggregate net worth, capital holding and foreign




















where QK and εD∗ are the value of QtKt and εtD∗t in the steady state re-
spectively. The macroprudential policy means that if the amount of capital
holding of the banks increases, the government raises tax rate on the capital
holding and the capital control means that if the amount of foreign bor-
rowing of the banks increases, the government raises tax rate on the foreign
borrowing.
3.5 Central Bank
The monetary policy follows the augmented Taylor rule as in Davis and
Presno (2017) in which the central bank adjusts the policy rate considering
foreign interest rate as well as inflation and output gap. This is to reflect that
the monetary policy in advanced economies drives the monetary policy rate
in the emerging market economies as shown by Kim (2014) and Hofmann
and Takáts (2015)
it − i = ρi(it−1 − i) + (1− ρi) [ωπ(πt − π) + ωy(Yt − Y ) + ωi∗(i∗t − i∗)] (23)
where i, i∗, π are the value of domestic and foreign nominal interest rate and
inflation in steady state. I assume that the policy rate equals to the deposit
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interest rate as in Christiano et al. (2010) and Curidia and Woodford (2009).
3.6 Foreign Economy
I focus on the small open economy which means all foreign economic variables
such as output Y ∗, price P ∗ and nominal interest rate R∗ are given. The first
two are assumed to be constant over time, while the foreign rate follows an
autoregressive stochastic process.
Y ∗t = Y
∗ = 1
P ∗t = P
∗ = 1
R∗t = (1− ρ∗R)R∗ + ρ∗RR∗t−1 + υR
∗
t
where R∗ is the steady-state level of the foreign interest rate and υR∗t is




t ∼ N(0, σ2R∗)
Foreign households decide export demand in small open economy accord-











where et and εt ≡ (etP ∗t /Pt) are the nominal and real exchange rates. The




Output consists of consumption, investment and its adjustment cost, export,
the cost of changing price, managing capital from households, raising funds











(πt−1)2Yt+χh(Kht , Kt)+χb(εtD∗t , QtKbt )
(25)
Net output which equals to final expenditure is
Y nett = Yt − εtMt −
κ
2
(πt − 1)2Yt − χh(Kht , Kt)− χb(εtD∗t , QtKbt )
Net foreign debt consists of net import and the repayment of foreign debt
from the previous period








The aggregate net worth of banks is the sum of the net worth of operating





t−1 −RtDt−1 − εtR∗t−1D∗t−1
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+ ξ(Zt + λQt)Kt−1 (27)

































The equilibrium is given by eight price variables (mct , πt, Zt, wt, it, εt, Qt,
τNt ), twelve quantity variables (Yt, Mt, Lt, Ct, It, Kt, EXt, Nt,Kbt , Kht , Dt,
D∗t ) and six bank variables (xt, ψt, φt, νt, µt, µ∗t ) which satisfy twenty six
equations (4-13, 16-31) given exogeouns stochastic process At,R∗t and initial
values for (Kt−1, Kbt−1, Dt−1, R∗t−1D∗t−1,it−1, At, R∗t )
4 Numerical Experiments
4.1 Parameters
In this model, I refer to the parameter values that fall generally in line with
the literature related to DSGE open economy for emerging market. Basically,
most parameter values are used from the ABK (2018). Table 2 summarizes
the parameter values that I use in this analysis and table 3 reports the steady
state values of the equilibrium. For the parameters related to households,
the discount rate (β) is set to 0.985, the inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor
supply (ζ) is 0.333, which is between 0.25 in Banerjee (2016) and 0.455 in
Kitano and Takaku (2020) and the labor coefficient (ζ0) 7.883, which is lower
than 4.060 in in Kitano and Takaku (2020). For the parameters related
producers, the cost share of capital and imported intermediate goods are
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set to 0.3, 0.18 respectively. The cost of adjusting price (κ) and adjusting
investment goods production (κI) is 55.743 (as in Nispi Landi (2020)) and
0.67 respectively. The depreciation rate is 0.02. For the parameters related
to banks, the bank survival rate is set to 0.94, which is lower than 0.96 (as
in Kitano and Takaku (2020) and Christiano et al (2010)) and 0.972 (as in
Gertler and Kiyotak (2010)) and the elasticity of leverage with respect to
foreign borrowing (θ) is 0.1 which means the fraction that the banker can
divert (Θ) deceases by 1% when the foreign borrowing increases by 10%.
The fraction of transfering to new banker (ξ) is 0.0046 in which is higher
than 0.0042 in Kitano and Takaku (2020). In addition, the steady state
value of foreign interest rate (R∗) is set to 1.02 in annual by obtaining the
average of 10-year US government bond after GFC (from 2009 to 2020). The
steady state value of domestic interest rate is 1.04 in annual assuming that
the sperad between the US and SOEs is 200bp2. The bank leverage multiple
equals 4 and the foreign borrowing to bank asset ratio equals 0.25 in the
steady state. In the baseline, the coefficients of Taylor rule (ωpi, ωy, ωi∗) are
1.5, 0.1, 0.1. and the coefficient of interest rate smoothing (ρi) is 0.8. In
baseline, the standard deviation of foreign shock (σ∗) is 1% in annualized
rate.
2After GFC (2009-2020), the average of the US 10-year government bond yields is
2.35 and that of 10-year government bond yields for several SOEs (Korea, Mexico, New
Zealand) is 4.19, that is, the spread is 184bp.
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Table 2: Baseline parameters
Description Value
Households
β discount rate 0.985
ζ inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply 0.333
ζ0 inverse fo labor supply 7.883
κh cost parameter of direct finance 0.0197
Producers
αK cost share of capital 0.3
αM cost share of imported intermediate goods 0.18
λ 1 - depreciation rate 0.98
η elasticity of demand 9
κ cost of adjusting price 55.743
κI cost of adjusting investment goods production 0.67
ϕ price elasticity of export demand 1
Banks
θ elasticity of leverage wrt foreign borrowing 0.1
θ0 divertable proportion of assets 0.399
σ survival probablity 0.94
ξ fraction of total assets brought by new banks 0.0046
κb management cost for foreign borrowing 0.219
Central Bank and Government
ρi Interest rate smoothing coefficient 0.8
ωπ, ωy, ωR∗ Taylor rule coefficients 1.5, 0.1, 0.1
ωK , ωD∗ macroprudential and capital control coefficients 0, 0
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Table 3: Baseline steady state (Annual)
Description Value
Q price of capital 1
π inflation rate 1
R∗ foreign interest rate 1.02
R domestic interest rate (=deposit interest rate) 1.04
φ bank leverage multiple 4
x foreign debt to bank asset ratio 0.25
χh cost of direct finance of households 0.0148
χb cost of foreign borrowing of banks 0.0141
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Baseline
In order to simulate impulse response functions, the model is solved using a
first-order approximation around the steady state. Figure 1 represents the
impulse response to the foreign interest rate shock by 1% in annual rate in the
baseline. The y-axis in the graph means the changes from the steady state
in quarterly except that the domestic and foreign interest rates and inflation
rates are in annual. The positive foreign interest rate shock depreciates the
real exchange rate and increases the volume of exports. This initially miti-
gates the decline in output and consumption. However, a depreciation of the
real exchange rate has two effects. The first is that it increases the bank’s real
foreign debt burden and reduces its net worth. This also reduces the bank’s
credit supply, which in turn declines investment and consumption, leading to
a recession. Second, a depreciation of real exchange rate increases inflation
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due to raising the price of imports. The central bank raises interest rates to
stabilize inflation, but this has the result of exacerbating the recession. It
is not easy for central bank to respond to stabilize inflation and recover the
recession caused by the shock of foreign interest rates.
Figure 1: Baseline impulse response to foreign interest rate by 1% without
policy
4.2.2 Impulse response under high and low interest rate environ-
ment
I simulate the impact of foreign interest rate shocks on the economy before
and after the GFC. Since the GFC, most countries have kept low interest
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rates to respond to economic downturns. Taking this into account, I set the
steady state interest rate level different from the baseline while keeping other
variables the same. Specifically, I set the foreign interest rate as R∗=1.04 and
the domestic interest rate as R=1.06, based on the average of the US 10-year
government bond yields before the GFC (from 2003 to 2008), assuming that
the spread between the US and SOEs is 200bp3. Figure 2 shows to compare
the impulse response of 1% foreign interest rates shock under low and high
interest rates. The solid line is the impulse response curve before the GFC
(R∗=1.04, R=1.06), and the dashed line, which is tha baseline, is after the
GFC (R∗=1.02, R=1.04). However, in the high interest rate environment,
assuming before the GFC, not only the capital price and the bank’s net worth
fall less, the decline in consumption and investment is also small compared
to the baseline. It implies that, under the foreign interest rate shock, low
interest rate environment after the GFC is more vulnerable to recession than
the high interest rate environment before the GFC.
3Before GFC (2003-2008), the average of the US 10-year government bond yields is
4.28 and that of 10-year government bond yields for several SOEs (Korea, Mexico, New
Zealand) is 6.62, that is, the spread is 234bp.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to the foreign interest rate shock by 1% under
low and high interest rate environment (R∗=1.02 and 1.04)
4.2.3 Impulse response with and without capital control
In this section, I examine the effect of capital control in the event of a foreign
interest rate shock. In other words, I compare the impulse response of foreign
interest rate shock under the circumstance with and without capital control
to identify whether there is an advantage of capital control. The capital
control coefficient (ωD∗) is adjusted to 0.2 for the circumstance with capital
control and 0 without capital control. In both situations, the coefficients of
Taylor rule are the same. Figure 3 shows the impulse response to the foreign
interest rate shock of the economy. The solid line represents the impulse
response curve when capital controls are present, and the dashed line is
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the baseline (without capital control). As mentioned before, capital control
means the form of tax rate, which is the increasing function of the deviation
of foreign borrowing from steady state. It can alleviate the effect of currency
depreciation. Thus, under capital control, inflation and capital prices move
less than when there is no capital control. Therefore, consumption, aggregate
output also move less. This means that economy with capital controls reduces
the likelihood of a recession compared to economy without capital controls.
Then, central bank can implement more aggressive monetary policy than in
the absence of capital control. In other words, if monetary policy and capital
control are implemented at the same time, it is possible to respond more
effectively to the foreign interest rate shock.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to the foreign interest rate shock by 1% with
and without capital control (ωD∗ = 0 and 0.2)
4.2.4 Impulse response with and without macroprudential policy
I also examine the effect of macroprudential policy under the foreign in-
terest rate shock. In the same way as the previous section, I compare the
impulse response of the foreign interest rate shock under the circumstance
with and without macroprudential policy to identify the merit of this pol-
icy. The macroprudential policy coefficient (ωK) is adjusted to 0.2 for the
circumstance with macroprudential policy and 0 without macroprudential
policy. In both situations, the coefficients of the Taylor rule are the same.
Figure 4 represents the impulse response to the foreign interest rate shock
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of the economy. The solid line represents the impulse response curve when
macroprudential policy is implemented, and the dashed line is the baseline.
As the previous chapter, macroprudential policy defines the form of tax rate,
which is the increasing function of the deviation of bank’s asset holdings
from steady state. Like capital control, it can mitigate the effect of currency
depreciation but capital price and bank’s net worth only slightly improve
compared to when there is no macroprudential policy. As a result, consump-
tion and aggregate output also improve slightly. In the end, macroprudential
policy is not effective in preventing the possibility of recession caused by the
foreign interest rate shock compared to capital control.
Figure 4: Impulse responses to the foreign interest rate shock by 1% with
and without macroprudential policy (ωK =0 and 0.2)
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4.2.5 Welfare analysis
In the previous section, it is confirmed that both capital control and macro-
prudential policy are effective in responding to the foreign interest rate shock,
even if there is a difference in degree. In this section, I quantitatively ana-
lyze how effective the two policies are. Thus I conduct the welfare analysis
to examine the effect of capital control and macroprudential policy by tak-
ing a second order approximation of the model, as done in Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2004). It is commonly used for welfare analysis in many litera-
tures. For policy evaluation, I compute the welfare level associated with a
particular policy rule and compare it to that in a baseline case. I assume the
welfare level is the conditional expected discounted utility of the represen-
tative household. The welfare associated with a particular value of capital
control or macroprudential policy conditional on the non-stochastic steady








where C and L are the consumption and labor in the steady state. I can
evaluate the welfare improving effect of capital control and macroprudential
policy in the several scenarios by comparing the value of εi associated with
the combination of (ωD∗,ωπ) and (ωK , ωπ) to that in the baseline case.
Table 4 represents the welfare gain from different combinations of mon-
etary policy and capital control. Each column denotes the alternative co-
efficients of capital control ωD∗= 0 , 0.1 and 0.2 and each row denotes the
alternative coefficients of Taylor rule ωπ= 1.25, 1.5 and 2.0. The number in
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the table is the change in welfare in terms of consumption equivalence rela-
tive to the baseline ωD∗= 0 and ωπ=1.5. It is confirmed that the coefficient of
capital control ωD∗= 0.2 leads to welfare gains by 5.54% when the coefficient
of Taylor rule ωπ is 1.5. There are also welfare gains from increasing the
coefficient of Taylor rule ωπ from 1.5 to 2.0. The combination of ωπ = 1.5and
ωD∗= 0.2 gives the highest welfare in the table.
Table 4: Welfare effect from the different combination of monetary policy
and capital control
ωD∗/ωπ 1.25 1.5 2.0
0 -2.04% 0.00% 0.64%
0.1 4.46 4.63 4.73
0.2 5.45 5.54 5.61
Table 5 shows the welfare gain from different combinations of monetary
policy and macroprudential policy. Each column denotes the alternative co-
efficients of maroprudential policy ωK= 0 , 0.1 and 0.2 and each row denotes
the alternative coefficients of Taylor rule ωπ= 1.25, 1.5 and 2.0. The number
in the table is the change in welfare in terms of consumption equivalence
relative to the baseline ωK= 0 and ωπ=1.5. The welfare gains from having
macroprudential policy of ωK= 0.2 is 0.82% when the coefficient of Taylor
rule ωπ is 1.5. However, the welfare gains from the combination of macropru-
dential policy and monetary policy are smaller than that of capital control
and monetary policy, even though the pattern of welfare effect is similar to
Table 4.
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Table 5: Welfare effect from the different combination of monetary policy
and macroprudential policy
ωK/ωπ 1.25 1.5 2.0
0 -2.04% 0.00% 0.64%
0.1 -0.92 0.64 0.97
0.2 0.00 0.82 0.82
The above results suggest that rather than macroprudential policy, capital
control is a useful instrument to supplement monetary policy in the event
of the foreign interest rate shock. Since capital control specifically targets
the foreign borrowing, this well complements the monetary policy. On the
other hand, macroprudential policy is less useful as it only reduces overall
borrowing of the economy regardless of residency of lenders.
5 Conclusion
After the GFC, the monetary authorities in major economies implemented
zero interest rate policy to recover the economy and many SOEs experi-
enced changes of unprecedented magnitude in capital flows. This has con-
tributed to accelerating the international financial integration. According to
the Dilemma phenomenon, the global factor limits the independence of mon-
etary policy under free capital movement regardless of the exchange regime.
Economists think that capital control and macroprudential policy can im-
prove the effectiveness of monetary policy in SOEs under the foreign interest
rate shock. In this paper, I focus on how macroprudential or capital control
policy complements monetary policy of small open economies in the face of
foreign interest rate shock around the steady state. The research questions
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are as follows: First, under the low inflation environment, is the impact of
foreign interest rate shock on SOEs greater than high interest rate environ-
ment? Second, Under the foreign interest rate shock, can macroprudential
or capital control policy increase the effectiveness of domestic monetary pol-
icy? Third, if both two policies are effective to mitigate the foreign shock,
which is the better policy to complement monetary policy? To deal with
these questions, I build the base model followed by Aoki et al. (2018) and
then simulate impulse response to foreign interest rate shock in several sce-
narios and compare the two policies in terms of welfare. The results show
that macroeconomic variables under low interest rate environment are more
volatile than under high interest rate when the foreign interest rate shock is
transmitted to SOEs. It implies that low interest rate environment is more
vulnerable to recession than high interest rate environment. I also find that
both macroprudential policy or capital control can help to mitigate the influ-
ence of foreign interest rate shock but capital control is the better instrument
than macroprudential policy in terms of welfare.
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